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ABSTRACT
Relation-Based Access Control (RelBAC) is an access con-
trol model for the Web scenarios, which represents permis-
sions as relations between users and objects. By exploiting
the formalization of RelBAC model in Description Logics
(DL), sophisticated access control policies can be directly
encoded as DL formulas. This facilitates the administra-
tion with design time reasoning on hierarchies, memberships,
propagations, separation of duties, etc. and helps with run
time reasoning to make access control decisions. All these
reasoning can be performed through state of the art, off-the-
shelf DL reasoners.
General Terms
Access Control
Keywords
RelBAC, access control policies, design-time reasoning, run
time reasoning
1. INTRODUCTION
Many new applications such as Online Social Networks, Blogs,
Shared Desktops and more traditional applications re-developed
following the Software as a Service allow users to store, edit,
share their data via the Web. The Web can potentially in-
crease the number and the quality of user interactions with
other users as a result of having a large community of con-
nected users and shared data. Many of these interactions
may span across several different organizations. They can
be one-off, short term or long term interactions. These types
of cross-organizational distribution poses new challenges for
users, making it more difficult to share data in a protected
way. As a consequence of that, many existing Web-based
services fail to offer a flexible and fine-grained protection.
In many cases, sharing is all-or-nothing while users need
support for rich and fine-grained security policies to at least
match those they can implement on traditional desktop ap-
plications. For many of those applications the data peo-
ple may want to share, their protection and organization
changes often and in an unpredictable way. This requires
tools to support the owner of such data in specifying the
access control rules and complex reasoning about policies,
while the system is in operation.
In [12] we proposed a new access control model and a logic,
called RelBAC (for Relation Based Access Control) which
allows us to deal with such novel scenarios. The key idea,
which differentiates the RelBAC model from the state of
the art, is that permissions are modeled as relations be-
tween users (called subjects in access control terminology)
and data (also called objects) while access control rules are
their instantiations, with arity, on specific sets of users and
objects. We define the RelBAC model as an Entity Rela-
tionship (ER) model [6] thus defining permissions as rela-
tions between classes of subjects and classes of objects. In
this paper, we complete our model by describing its rea-
soning ability both at design and run time. By exploiting
the well known translation of ER diagrams into Description
Logics (DL) [2], we define a (Description) logic, called the
RelBAC Logic, which allows us to express and reason about
users, objects, permissions, access control rules and policies.
In turn, this allows us to reason about policies by using state
of the art, off-the-shelf, DL Reasoners, e.g., Pellet[20].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
shows a motivating example. Section 3 gives a brief intro-
duction to RelBAC model. Reasoning with RelBAC for
design time and run time is shown in Section 4 and Section
5. In Section 6 we’ll show how RelBAC integrate a reasoner
for reasoning tasks. Section 7 summaries related works and
we conclude in Section 8.
2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
As a motivating example we use the case of a Web-based
sales force automation (SFA) application. A SFA is typi-
cally a client-server application that provides a set of tools
and services such as e-mail, reporting, database of contacts,
a more or less complex document management system, to
support salesmen in their pre-sale (i.e. preparing the offer)
and post-sale (i.e. scouting for follow up contracts) activ-
ities. Most small and medium companies cannot afford to
run their own server, so many vendors offer it also as a ser-
vice, accessible by mean of a Web-based client. To be useful
the service must offer to the management of the company a
flexible and fine-grained access control able to map respon-
sibilities and operations for the company’s sales force. At
Figure 1: The ER Diagram of the RelBAC Model.
the same time, each salesman, typically paid on bonuses, is
quite protective about her own contacts and negotiations,
so she should be able to indicate further security constraints
to protect her own data. At the same time, any non trivial
contract acquisition requires collaborations among salesmen
and also support from the technical department to have any
chance of success, so there should be also the possibility to
specify temporary and dynamic access control policies.
In the above scenario we assume the following policies:
1. A sales agent can create at most one customer folder
per sector.
2. At most 2 sales agents and a sales manager can be
involved in a new offer provided they are not involved
already in more than 3 other offers.
3. At least 2 sales agents should be involved in a sector.
4. Any sales agent cannot read more than 3 customer
folders belonging to at most 2 different industrial sec-
tors.
5. At least one sales agent with experience in Industrial
Sector ICT must be involved in Offer Information High-
ways.
In the next section we introduce the RelBAC model and
then illustrate through the paper how to apply it on our
motivating example.
3. RELBAC
In this section, we describe briefly the RelBAC model that
we proposed in [12] and its logical framework.
As is shown in the ER Diagram of Figure 1, RelBAC has
the following components. SUBJECT (or USER): a subject is
a user (or her agent) that requests an access to some re-
sources. OBJECT: an object is any resource of the system
a user requests access. PERMISSION: the intuition is that a
PERMISSION is an operation that users can perform on ob-
jects. To capture this intuition a PERMISSION is named with
the name of the operation it refers to, e.g., Write, Read op-
eration or some more high-level operation, e.g., Assign or
Manage. In RelBAC model, the original form of a verb is
used as a PERMISSION name with the first letter capitalized.
For SUBJECT and OBJECT, the loops represent the IS-A re-
lations that form the hierarchies of user groups and object
classes. This is coherent to the tradition how people orga-
nize their desktop resources: a top-down tree-like file sys-
tem. The most interesting part is the loop on PERMISSION
which represents the IS-A relations among named pairs, e.g.,
Update(manager1, offer1), etc. such that the set theory
Table 1: Formalization of RelBAC in DL
ER model DL formalization
SUBJECT, OBJECT concepts as Ui, Oj
PERMISSION roles as Pk
GENERALIZATION subsumption rules as C v D(P v Q)
RULE DL formulas
Figure 2: Subjects and Objects of an SFA Scenario.
applies on PERMISSIONs (sets of named pairs). For example,
the IS-A relation that ‘Update is more powerful than Read’
can be captured with the intuition that those people who
can access some data with the permission ‘Update’ should
have already been assigned the permission ‘Read’.
In RelBAC, a RULE associates a PERMISSION to a specific set
of (SUBJECT,OBJECT) pairs. The Entity-Relationship model
of RelBAC can be formalized directly in Description Loigc
[2] as listed in Table 1.
Now we show how to use them for our motivating example.
We abstract the scenario into ER diagrams as Figure 2 and
Figure 3. SUBJECT: employees, sales directors, sales man-
agers, sales agents and sales representatives; OBJECT: digital
documents for sales, sectors, customers, offers; PERMISSION:
involve, manage, create, read, update, delete.
Using standard DL formulas, the policies of our motivating
can be translated into the following RULEs:
1. Agent v≤ 1Create.(Customeru ≤ 1Compose.Sector)
2. {Offer v≤ 2Involve.Agentunionsq ≤ 1Involve.Manager,
Employee v≤ 3Involve−1.Offer}
3. Sector v≥ 2Involve.Agent
4. Agent v≤ 3Involve−1.(Customeru ≤ 2Compose.Sector
5. ≥ 1Involve.(Agent u InvolvedIn : ICT )(ih)
Figure 3: Permissions of an SFA Scenario.
where Compose is a role among objects and ‘ih’ is an in-
stance of concept Offer standing for ‘Information Highways’.
The benefit of expressing policies and security properties us-
ingRelBAC is the ability to reason about them. Complexity
study [2] of DL shows that a concept satisfiability problem,
which is the formalization of RelBAC reasoning problem
is decidable if we restrict the language as SHIOQ without
any complex DL role constructors such as role conjunction
or disjunction.
4. DESIGN TIME REASONING
We can identify two phases when we need reasoning. At
design time, reasoning supports policy writers to determine
possible redundancy and conflicts or to verify if the set of
policies satisfy a desired static security property (i.e. sepa-
ration of duties). The reasoning abilities can be also used at
run time, which we will show in the next section.
In RelBAC, the knowledge base is divided into two parts.
The knowledge dealing with domain terminologies of the
model is called P (for Policy) such as the names of user
groups, object classes, hierarchies, etc. P is rather stable
after design. The rest that relates to individuals is called
S (for State) such as membership of a user to a group, at-
tributes of individuals, etc. S is quite dynamic sensitive to
the system changes.
4.1 Hierarchy
Different relations such as IS-A, composed of, responsible
for, etc. can form various hierarchies as in Figure 2. A
feature of RelBAC is its natural formalization of ‘IS-A’ hi-
erarchies. The ‘IS-A’ relations can be represented as partial
order ‘≥’ in RelBAC to form the tree-like hierarchy not
only among groups but among classes and permissions. For
example, in Figure 2(b), the classification of offers into sub-
sets Processed, ToDo and Urgent shows a hierarchy of ‘IS-A’
relations among objects.
There are many constraints in real life for the inheritance
through hierarchies in an access control system. Gavrila
et al. specified in [10] user/role and role/role relationship
constraints under first order logic. Here we list the three
such constraints and discuss how RelBAC can enforce them
in building and managing hierarchies.
CASE 1: ‘A concept should not be declared directly or in-
directly as a subconcept of itself.’
According to the interpretation of RelBAC, the antisym-
metry property of the partial order ‘v’ applies to groups,
classes and permissions. To enforce this constraint, we ex-
ploit subsumption check as follows.
P |= C v D?
For group hierarchy, given two groups U1, U2, RelBAC checks
the subsumption as P |= U1 v U2? A ‘Yes’ answer restricts
U2 v U1 to be added to P. For example, a sales man-
ager is also an employee can be formalized as ‘Manager v
Employee’ and if the administrator asserts by mistake that
an employee is also a sales manager, a check of ‘P,S |=
Manager v Employee?’ is processed and help avoid loops
in the group hierarchy.
CASE 2: ‘An individual should not be declared belonging to
a concept and its subconcept at the same time.’
Given that U1 ≥ U2, for any user u, if U1(u) holds then we
have U2(u) implied by the reasoner. Thus this constraint can
be rephrased as ‘a user should not be declared as member of
a group she already belongs to.’ This constraint relates to
two administration operations, add and delete which we will
discuss in details in Section 4.2.
CASE 3: ‘A set cannot be subset of two sets that are mu-
tually exclusive.’
This constraint holds according to the following theorem.
{U1 u U2 v ⊥, U v U1, U v U2} |= U v ⊥
For example, Manager u Agent v ⊥ formalizes that Sales
Manager and Sales Agent are mutually exclusive. Then any
attempt to assign one user to both groups will be checked
as inconsistent. This is used also on separation of duties in
Section 4.4.
Notice that not all paths in the hierarchies imply inheri-
tance. We just model those inheritable with partial order
and formalize them into subsumption formulas. Here we
talked about user group ‘IS-A’ hierarchy only, and of course
these cases can be applied to permission and object hierar-
chies according to classic set theory.
4.2 Membership
Employees of our SFA scenario are grouped as sales direc-
tor, sales manager, etc. Similar to what RBAC does with
roles, RelBAC provides an access control mechanism based
on membership of groups such as to grant that sales man-
agers can read offers. With the growing size and number of
the groups, the management of user membership becomes
crucial. The RelBAC logic can help the administrator to
control these memberships.
Adding (deleting) an individual user from an existing sub-
ject group means only adding (deleting) an assertion to (from)
the knowledge base S. For example, to add a user u as a sales
manager, we can just add to S one assertion Manager(u).
This will give u all the permissions assigned to Manager
just as the assignment of a role in RBAC. However, be-
fore adding this state assertion to S, the administrator must
check the following two properties:
Redundancy An assertion is redundant if it can be inferred
from the existing knowledge base already. To check that u
Figure 4: Delete Membership in Hierarchy.
is a member of Ui is the entailment reasoning as follows:
P,S |= Ui(u)?
A ‘Yes’ answer means that this membership is not necessary
because the knowledge base implies it already. This can
happen in two cases. Either Ui(u) exists already in S or u
inherits the membership through group hierarchies.
Conflict If the knowledge base is consistent, but after adding
the assertion it is no longer consistent any more, the asser-
tion is conflicting with the knowledge base. To check conflict
is the consistency reasoning as follows:
P,S |= ⊥?
Conflicts are checked on the updated knowledge base S ′
which is S ∪ {Ui(u)}. A ‘No’ answer means that the up-
dated knowledge base is still consistent and the operation to
add the membership of u to Ui can be performed.
When adding a user u as a member of a group Ui in a group
hierarchy of partial order, we can do the same as without
the hierarchy because the ‘IS-A’ relation does not bring ex-
ceptions for the redundancy and conflict checking. Deleting
a user u from Ui, is more complicated considering that it
might have impact on the membership of u to other groups
in the hierarchy. In order to get the most specific group the
user u belongs to, a form of realization reasoning is used to
find the most specific concept Ui in the given concept set
{U1, ..., Un}, such that P,S |= Ui(u).
The following steps should be followed in order to delete a
user membership in a group hierarchy.
1. Entailment checking P,S |= Ui(u)? A ‘No’ answer means
that u is not a member of Ui and nothing else need to be
done; otherwise go to Step 2.
2. Realization checking for the most specific group Uj u
belongs and subsumption checking such that Uj satisfies
Uj ≥ Ui (Uj can be exactly Ui).
3. Subsumption checking for all Uk such that Uj ≥ Uk and
entailment checking such that Uk(u) can be implied by the
knowledge base.
4. Delete Uj(u), and for all k add to knowledge base Uk(u)
after entailment checking for redundancy and conflict. And
go to Step 1.
As shown in Figure 4(a), the most complex situation is when
membership of u to Ui is propagated from Uj which satis-
fies Uj ≥ Ui with some intermediate group U ′j . Thus the
deletion of u from Ui requires the compensation of adding
u as member of all Uk, U
′
k... till it reaches Ui. As an ex-
ample, let us assume that in our motivating example there
is an extra group PowerfulAgent that enable members to
be both a sales agent and a sale manager. So the resulting
hierarchy is as Figure 4(b). If the administrator wants to
remove this anomaly and make sure that no sales agent can
be assigned as a sales manager then the deletion of member-
ship to Manager requires not only the removal of assertion
PowerfulAgent(john) but the compensation of adding as-
sertion Agent(john). The process will consist in compen-
sation to Manager(john) as in step 3 and deletion of this
assertion in the next loop.
In this section we discussed only groups membership, how-
ever, object classes and permissions are also sets, with ob-
jects or (subject, object) pairs as elements, their member-
ship management is then dealt similarly to that of groups.
4.3 Propagation
Membership and permission propagation are not new. In
RBAC [8], user assignments and permission1 assignments
propagate through role hierarchy. The senior roles inherit
the permission from junior roles and junior roles inherit users
from senior roles.
Sometimes, this propagation is not welcomed from manage-
ment point of view. For example, a CEO does not have
(and she does not want or need) all the permissions on all
the operations a sales agent can perform. The CEO retains
responsibility for all the employees of her company without
the need to perform all the operations they can perform. We
will show details how membership and permission propagate
in the RelBAC model in this section.
4.3.1 Membership Propagation
The advantage of RelBAC is that the natural model of ‘IS-
A’ relation brings ‘free’ propagation through ‘IS-A’ hierar-
chies. By ‘free’ we mean that no extra rule is needed to
specify the propagation after the ‘IS-A’ relations are clearly
designed. That is to say, user membership propagation de-
pends on group ‘IS-A’ hierarchy only. Given any two groups
Ui, Uj such that Ui ≥ Uj and u is a member of Ui then the
membership of u to Uj can be automatically implied by the
reasoner. Notice the transitivity of partial order is preserved
by the model ‘v’ so it’s not necessary that Ui, Uj are directly
connected in the hierarchy. Similarly, an object membership
propagates through class ‘IS-A’ hierarchy.
For example, if Bob is a sales manager and Manager ≥
Employee then Bob is an employee comes for free as the
reasoner entails that
{Manager(bob),Manager v Employee} |= Employee(bob)
4.3.2 Permission Propagation
The permission propagation is more complex because aRelBAC
permission is a binary relation that links a subject to an ob-
ject. Thus it has three paths to propagate: ‘IS-A’ hierarchy
of subjects, objects and permissions.
1A permission in RBAC is a pair (p, o) where o is the ob-
ject and p is the operation to access with. In RelBAC, a
PERMISSION is a relation between SUBJECT and OBJECT.
Policies in form of ‘Ui v Uj ’ provide a way to build ‘IS-A’
hierarchy of user groups. Thus, permissions propagate from
junior group to senior groups as
{Uj v Ui, Ui v α} |= Uj v α
in which α stands for some permission assignment. For ex-
ample, Manager ≥ Employee implies that all the permis-
sions assigned to the employees propagate to sales managers.
In addition to the group hierarchy which simulates the role
hierarchy in RBAC model, RelBAC provides object class
and permission hierarchy with partial order ‘≥’ applied on
classes and on permissions as ‘Oi v Oj ’ and ‘Pi v Pj ’.
For two assignments β, β′ with the same permission P , but
on different object classes Oi, Oj , if Oi ≥ Oj the propaga-
tion goes in different ways according to the semantics of the
assignment.
• If β, β′ are assignments onto some (only, at least n) objects
in Oi and Oj , then
{Oi v Oj , U v β} |= U v β′
For example, sales agents are allowed to read some (only, at
least 3) processed offers implies that sales agents are allowed
to read some (only, at least 3) offers because processed offers
are subset of offers as in the assertion Processed v Offer.
• If β, β′ are assignments onto all (at most n) objects in Oi
and Oj , then
{Oi v Oj , U v β′} |= U v β
For example, employees are allowed to read all (at most 5)
offers implies that sales managers are allowed to read all (at
most 5, maybe less) processed offers because Processed v
Offer.
Permissions can propagate through the permission hierarchy
as well. In contrast to sets of individuals such as groups or
classes, the partial order among permissions describes sub-
sumption between sets of (u, o) pairs. For example, Manage v
Read implies that any assignment with permission Manage
is also assigned with Read such as those are allowed to man-
age offers implies that they are also allowed to read offers.
Propagations are the result of the reasoning on all the three
kinds of ‘IS-A’ hierarchies together (through the partial or-
der). No specific propagation rules are necessary for such
propagations. This feature will simplify the system design
and reduce the possibility of errors.
4.4 Separation of Duties
Advanced access control models support Separation of Du-
ties (SoD) as an important security property. Here, we dis-
cuss SoD in general and the support of high level concerns
about SoD as discussed in [17].
4.4.1 Separation of Duties
In RelBAC, a permission is a relation that links a subject
with an object, and for SoD the only thing to do is to assert
axioms about permissions.
For example, two steps of a bank transaction are to initiate a
transaction and to authorize the transaction. The two steps
should be separated duties for clerk and supervisor of the
bank. RelBAC can describe this SoD with an axiom as
follows that can be checked by the reasoner.
Initiate uAuthorize v ⊥
In general, given n steps of a task as step1, ..., stepn, a SoD
enforces at lest k(2 ≤ k ≤ n) users take all these duties,
which means that any user can have at mostm (m = dn/(k−
1)e − 1) of these duties. Thus any m + 1 of these rights
should not be assigned to any single user. Then RelBAC
can formalize this as follows.
C
dn/(k−1)e
n G
i=1
(udn/(k−1)ej=1 Uij) v ⊥
in which Uij stands for the groups for each group at most
m arbitrary duties are assigned.
Suppose in our example that the permission Manage Offer
requires 3 steps create offer, fulfill offer and archive offer and
an SoD enforces that at least 2 employees should be involved
in managing an offer. This SoD can be enforced as follows.
∃Create.Offer u ∃Fulfill.Offer u ∃Archive.Offer v ⊥
as C
dn/(k−1)e
n = C
d3/(2−1)e
3 = C
3
3 = 1.
4.4.2 High Level Constraint of SoD
For general SoD constraints, the composition of k users to
complete a task is sometimes important. N.Li et al. intro-
duce an algebra in [17] to specify complex policies combin-
ing requirements on user attributes and cardinality. Apart
from the cardinality for a given permission, their algebra
can specify the composition of the users for the SoD which
they regard as high-level policy. Examples of such high-level
policies are the following:
1. Exactly two users, one sales manager and one sales agent.
2. At least one sales manager and one sales agent, and some
other sales managers or agents.
3. At least one sales manager and one sales agent, and some
other employees besides sales managers and agents.
RelBAC can express such constraints using object-centric
rules as follows:
Offer v (= 2Manage−1.User)u(= 1Manage−1.Manager)u
(= 1Manage−1.Agent)
Offer v (∀Manage−1.(Manager unionsqAgent))u
(∃Manage−1.Manager) u (∃Manage−1.Agent)
Offer v (∃Manage−1.Manager) u (∃Manage−1.Agent)
Here we abbreviate the usage of both ≥ n and ≤ n as = n
in standard DL value restriction.
5. RUN TIME REASONING
Once we expressed the set of policies that apply to a system
as a RelBAC knowledge base, run time reasoning can be
performed for access control decision and dynamic separa-
tion of duties.
5.1 Access Control Decision
Basically, to decide whether a user u has some permission
P on some object o, RelBAC submit a query for knowl-
edge P (u, o) to the knowledge base predefined with P,S. If
P (u, o) is inferred by the knowledge base, the decision should
be ‘Yes’; otherwise, ‘No’. In addition to this, RelBAC is
able to take decisions on many complex access requests as
follows. Here user u belongs to a group U , an object o be-
longs to a class O, and P is a permission.
• Is u allowed to access o with P? For example, is a sales
manager named Hill allowed to read an offer called ‘Server’?
P,S |= P (u, o)?e.g., Read(hill, Server)
• Is u allowed to access some objects in O with P? For
example, is Hill allowed to read some processed offers?
P,S |= (∃P.O)(u)?e.g., (∃Read.Processed)(hill)
• Is u allowed to access maximum/minimum n of the objects
in O with P? For example, is Hill allowed to read maximum
5 of the processed offers?
P,S |= (≤ (≥)nP.O)(u)?e.g., (≤ 5Read.Processed)(hill)
Here value restriction ≤ n is used to express maximum
n, n=5. Other number restrictions such as minimum are
straight forward. The exact restriction = n can be expressed
with combination of maximum and minimum. Strictly more
than n and less than n can be achieved with minimum n+1
and maximum n-1 because in RelBAC, number restrictions
are about natural number only.
• Is u allowed to access all the objects in O with P? For
example, is Hill allowed to read all the processed offers?
P,S |= (∀O.P )(u)?e.g., (∀Processed.Read)(hill)
• Is there any user(s) in U allowed to access all objects in
O with P? For example, is there any sales manager allowed
to read all the processed offers?
P,S |= O v ∃P−1.U?e.g., Processed v ∃Read−1.Manager)
because the virtual group ∃Read−1.Manager denotes the
set of all the objects that can be read by some sales man-
agers.
• Are there maximum/minimum n users in U allowed to ac-
cess all the objects in O? For example, is there minimum 3
managers allowed to read all the processed offers?
P,S |= O v≤ (≥)nP−1.U?e.g., Processed v≥ 3Read−1.Manager
• Is each user of U allowed to access maximum/minimum n
objects in O? For example, is every sales manager allowed
to read more than 10 offers?
P,S |= U v≤ (≥)nP.O?e.g.,Manager v≥ 11Read.Offer
• Is each user of U allowed to access all objects in O with
P? For example, is each of the managers allowed to read all
the processed offers?
P,S |= U v ∀O.P?e.g.,Manager v ∀Offer.Read
because the virtual class ∀Offer.Read denotes a set of all
the users that can read all the processed offers.
Figure 5: The System Architecture using RelBAC.
We can see from the above that flexible queries can be an-
swered by the reasoner. So complex access control requests
can be decided such as those requests with arity constraints.
5.2 Dynamic Separation of Duties
Separation of Duties (SoD) is categorized into static and
dynamic. Static SoD can be represented in RelBAC as dis-
cussed in Section 4.4.1. Dynamic SoD intuitively allows the
duties assigned to one user in case that they are not acti-
vated simultaneously at run time.
To enforce dynamic SoD, RelBAC introduces a new kind
of permission, run time permissions (RTP) to describe the
state of individuals at run time. A RTP is a permission
describing the execution of a permission. For each permis-
sion in form of a verb (phrase), the corresponding RTP is
the present continuous tense of the verb. For example, the
RTP of permission ‘read’ is ‘reading’. To support dynamic
SoD, for each RelBAC permission, a RTP is introduced.
Moreover a user cannot have an RTP unless she has the
original permission. For the example of permission ‘read’,
Reading ≥ Read is used to restrict that a user cannot
execute permission ‘reading’ without the permission ‘read’.
Thus the dynamic SoD ‘an offer cannot be read by some
agent while being updated by a sales manager’ is specified as
follows.
∃Reading−1.Agent u ∃Updating−1.Manager v ⊥
Dynamic SoD is specified at design time and enforced at
run time. The knowledge base must be informed of all ac-
tivated permissions such as Ann is reading an offer ‘Infor-
mation Highway’ and be updated adding a new assertion
Reading(ann, ih). Then the dynamic SoD will take effect
that no manager can update offer ‘Information Highway’
which is an entailment of the reasoner that
P,Sunionsq{Reading(ann, ih)} |= (Updating : ih)uManager v ⊥
If a request of a manager to update ih comes, it’ll be rejected.
6. AUTOMATED REASONING
In this section, we present the architecture of a system imple-
menting the RelBAC model. As shown in Figure 5, the user
interface (UI) stands between users and the other compo-
nents of the system and interprets the queries to the knowl-
edge base. The knowledge base consists of two parts namely,
P and S. The reasoner interacts with databases and users
(through UI). Hollow arrows stand for user related opera-
tion or information exchange; solid arrows represents inter-
nal data flow and interaction.
• From the perspective of an administrator, the hollow ar-
rows (a) and (b) are direct queries and updates to the knowl-
edge base, where the solid arrow (h) represents the interac-
tion of knowledge between P and S. The reasoning service
at design time to perform redundancy checking and conflict
checking are offered to the administrator by arrow (c), Ar-
row (e), (g) and (f) stand for reasoning with P, S and both,
corresponding to standard TBox, ABox and TBox+ABox
reasoning in DL.
• From a requester point of view, a query for permission is
interpreted by the UI and handed to the reasoner through
arrow (d). The reasoner processes the query as an entail-
ment reasoning with respect to the knowledge base through
arrows (e), (f) and (g) to provide access control decisions.
Our implementation integrates an open source reasoner Pel-
let [20] through owl-api. The state of the art Pellet 2.0 offers
necessary reasoning ability for entailment, consistency, sub-
sumption, and realization. The incremental reasoning about
ABox updates in Pellet is useful for RelBAC as the run time
membership update relies on ABox changes and reasoning.
To get a test data for the system, we build an ontology
with RDF/OWL language describes the scenario of the mo-
tivating example. Sample policies listed in Section 2 are
covered by these ontologies. We randomly generated for
groups and classes hundreds of individuals. We test consis-
tency checking performance on this knowledge base with the
results listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Policy Base Consistency Test
Size(kb) Set Rule Individual Time(ms)
1 61.0 14 10 426 48.0
2 86.8 141 131 162 592.0
3 141.1 141 131 483 2191.0
4 273.4 141 131 805 5677.0
A small business with 5 user groups, 9 object classes, about
400 individuals (including employees and documents) with
10 access control rules can be formalized in an ontology of
61.0kb. And it takes less than 50 ms to complete consistency
checking as is shown by the first record of the table. When
the business grows in the number of set (either group or
class) and in the number of rules into more than 10 times (as
record 2), the checking time grows too. Even just increase
the number of individuals randomly for users or objects, the
time consumed grow exponentially. It is a preliminary test,
but shows that the general purpose reasoner does not per-
form well on an access control problem of the Web scenario.
Although RelBAC uses a decidable DL language, to achieve
a real-time access control system still requires much work.
7. RELATEDWORK
Access control is not a new topic. The amount of work which
has been done on RBAC and its level of development is in-
comparably high (see, e.g., [8, 1, 19] or [4]). A preliminary
version of RelBAC was introduced in [12]. In that paper
we introduced the idea and the logic of the model but we
did not cover the reasoning ability of the model, that are
the main topic of this paper. As already hinted in the pre-
vious sections the main difference of RelBAC with respect
to RBAC is that the former models permissions as ER rela-
tions thus making them first class objects (which can evolve
independently of users and objects), and thus allowing for
arity aware access control policies. Furthermore the use of
ER relations allows for a direct embedding of policies into
a (Description) Logic which allows to reason about them.
Yet another difference from RBAC is the formation of hi-
erarchies. Role hierarchies serves as an advanced feature
in RBAC but not necessarily true for different scenarios as
discussed by Li et al. in [16]. RelBAC provides not only
the partial order for permission propagation with natural
formalization as discussed in Section 4.3, but a way to for-
malize any binary relations that forms the hierarchy which
doesn’t propagate permissions.
A lot of work has also been developed towards providing log-
ical frameworks which would allow to reason about RBAC
based policies, see, e.g., [3, 13, 18]. Besides the differences
in the underlying logic and in the specifics of the formaliza-
tions, a conceptual difference is that all these logical frame-
works have been added on top of RBAC, while RelBAC is
defined natively with its own (Description) Logic. As a non
trivial plus of our approach, it becomes possible (with only a
bit of effort) in RelBAC to have non-logic experts to handle
policies and to reason about them using state of the art rea-
soning technologies (the SAT technology - used within DL
reasoners - is by far the most advanced technology and the
one mostly used in real world applications).
Some work has also been done in formalizing RBAC in DL.
Thus, for instance, DL is used in [21] in order to formal-
ize relations as binary roles while, more recently, Jung-Hwa
Chae et.al use DL to formalize the object hierarchy of RBAC
[5]. This work is again very different from ours as here DL
is just another logic used to reason about RBAC instead of
the logic designed to express (RelBAC ) policies.
Other researchers have dealt with the problem we are inter-
ested in. Thus for instance, Juri et al. propose an access
control solution for sharing semantic data across desktops
[7]. They use a three dimensional access control matrix to
represent fine-grained policies. We see a problem in that
their solution does not seem to scale well since the matrix
grows polynomially with the number of objects and of sets
of users sharing such objects (as from above, RelBAC, like
RBAC does not have this problem since it uses hierarchies to
represent knowledge about users, objects and permissions.)
Other authors have addressed the problem of access control
in open and dynamic environments by adapting RBAC. One
such approach is [3].
A lot of research has been done to use logic for policy ver-
ification [14, 9, 15]. Just to mention a couple of examples.
Organisation has been considered as an extension of role in
ORBAC model [14]. Kalam et al. used a first-order logic
based logic to formalize the model, which models the control
problem with named triples. In contrast, we use Description
Logic as the formalism which is a decidable subset of first
order logic. K. Fisler et al. proposed a tool named Margrave
[9] implemented with BDD at the back end. Our solution
is based on Description Logic which is more expressive than
propositional logic. V. Kolovski et al. use Defeasible De-
scription Logic rules to model the policy in [15]. However,
the main difference between these approaches and RelBAC
is not much about the reasoning abilities of one logic over
another one but rather the attempt made by RelBAC to
provide a solution that allows to write access control rules
using a well known notation such ER diagrams and then
translate them into DL, similarly to what done in knowl-
edge representations. This has the clear advantage of using
a well known methodology and having the possibility to use
a large variety of mature and well studied tools.
8. CONCLUSION
RelBAC models permissions as binary relations, a first class
component. It allows to express many complex properties,
and especially powerful in arity related policies. In this pa-
per, we illustrated on advantage of RelBAC that is the abil-
ity to use off-the-shelf reasoners to reason about typical ac-
cess control problems and properties. In this first evaluation
we showed that many reasoning tasks are supported. How-
ever, state of the art reasoners are not specifically designed
for RelBAC so the time consumed is hardly ‘real-time’ as
it is too slow. As part of future work we will study how to
improve efficiency. We would like also to test the reasoner
against policies more complex than the one considered in
this paper and possibly extend the class of security prop-
erties we test. Other direction of future work is to exploit
Semantic Matching [11] to support the generation of permis-
sions based on similarity.
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